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Feature Comment: tempering ‘Buy 
american’ In the recovery act—
Steering Clear of a trade War
Regulators	 have	 begun	 drafting	 new	 rules	 to	
implement	the	“Buy	American”	provisions	in	the	
American	Recovery	and	Reinvestment	Act	of	2009	
(the	“Recovery	Act”),	P.L.	111-5.	See	51	GC	¶	60;	
Peter	Orszag,	Director,	U.S.	Office	of	Management	
and	Budget,	Memorandum	M-09-10,	Initial Imple-
menting Guidance for the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009,	at	47	 (Feb.	18,	2009),	
available	 at	www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/ 
memoranda_fy2009/m09-10.pdf. Specifically,	
§	1605	of	the	Recovery	Act	requires	that,	for	pub-
lic	works	and	public	buildings	funded	by	the	new	
law,	 all	 iron,	 steel	 and	manufactured	 goods	 be	
produced	in	the	U.S.	The	regulation	implement-
ing	§	1605	may	be	published	as	an	interim	rule	
and,	 presumably,	 become	 binding	 immediately	
because	 of	 the	 need	 to	 rush	 implementation	 of	
the	Recovery	Act.	
We	remain	concerned	that	the	new	rule	imple-
menting	the	Buy	American	provisions	may	prove	
one	 of	 this	 year’s	most	 important	 procurement	
measures.	If	not	carefully	drawn,	the	rule	could	help	
draw	the	world	economy	deeper	into	a	debilitating	
spiral	of	protectionism.	See,	e.g., Steven	L.	Schooner	
and	Christopher	R.	Yukins,	“Public	Procurement:	
Focus	on	People,	Value	for	Money	and	System	Integ-
rity,	Not	Protectionism,”	in The Collapse of Global 
Trade, Murky Protectionism, and the Crisis: Recom-
mendations for the G20,	 at	 87	 (Richard	Baldwin	
and	Simon	Evenett	 eds.)	 (March	2009),	 available	
at www.voxeu.org;	Robert	D.	Anderson	and	William	
E.	Kovacic,	“Competition	Policy	and	Trade	Liber-
alisation:	Essential	Complements	to	Ensure	Good	
Performance	in	Public	Procurement	Markets,”	2009	
Pub.	Proc.	L.	Rev.	67.	
The	 timing	 could	 not	 be	more	 delicate.	This	
rulemaking	comes	just	before	the	April	2009	G-20	
summit,	when	the	U.S.	will	attempt	to	persuade	its	
(at	 this	point,	 skeptical)	major	European	 trading	
partners	to	undertake	a	massive,	coordinated	stim-
ulus	effort.	See	Bob	Davis,	“U.S.	to	Push	for	Global	
Stimulus,”	Wall	Street	Journal,	March	9,	2009,	at	
A1.	In	an	effort	to	assess	and,	hopefully,	inform	the	
likely	next	steps,	this	Feature Comment	reviews	the	
history	of	§	1605	and	discusses	a	number	of	paths	
the	rule-writers	may	take.
Background: The Recovery Act’s Buy 
American Requirements—When	 the	Recovery	
Act	originally	passed	the	House,	the	bill	stated	that	
all	iron	and	steel	used	in	stimulus	projects	for	pub-
lic	buildings	or	public	works	had	to	be	produced	in	
the	U.S.	The	Senate	went	further,	requiring	that	all	
iron,	steel	and	“manufactured	goods”	be	produced	
here.	Then,	 in	 response	 to	 sharp	 criticism	 that	
the	legislation	might	launch	a	trade	war,	see,	e.g., 
Gary	Clyde	Hufbauer	and	Jeffrey	J.	Schott,	“Buy	
American:	Bad	for	Jobs,	Worse	for	Reputation,”	PIIE	
Policy	Brief	 09-02	 (February	 2009),	 available	 at	
www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/pb/pb09-2. 
pdf,	the	Senate	appears	to	have	backpedaled	and	
amended	the	bill	to	clarify	that	the	Buy	American	
requirements	must	be	enforced	“in	a	manner	consis-
tent	with	United	States	obligations	under	interna-
tional	agreements.”	See,	e.g., Congressional Record, 
Feb.	 4,	 2009,	 at	 S1528;	David	W.	Burgett,	Lewis	
E.	Leibowitz	and	Andrew	C.	Ertley,	Feature	Com-
ment,	“How	Will	Buy	America	Restrictions	Affect	
Stimulus	Spending?,”	51	GC	¶	51;	Jason	Matechak,	
Feature	Comment,	“No	Way	BAA:	Domestic	Prefer-
ences	and	the	Stimulus	Package,” 6	IGC	¶	9.
Many	assumed	that	the	Senate’s	compromise	
put	the	trade	issues	to	bed	by	stipulating	that	the	
U.S.	would	comply	with	its	preexisting	international	
commitments.	We	are	not	so	sanguine.	The	revised	
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legislation	 leaves	many	questions	 open,	which,	un-
fortunately,	only	nourished	the	anxieties	of	the	U.S.’	
trading	partners.	
Impacts of the Buy American Provisions—
No	matter	how	the	regulatory	process	turns	out,	we	
already	foresee	a	number	of	important	results	caused	
by	the	Recovery	Act’s	Buy	American	provisions.
International Support for Open Markets ...:	
Deeply	 concerned	by	Congress’	willingness	 to	 veer	
towards	protectionism,	leaders	from	around	the	world	
continue	to	press	for	open	markets.	In	an	address	to	
Congress	 on	March	 4,	UK	Prime	Minister	Gordon	
Brown	asked:
But	should	we	succumb	to	a	race	to	the	bottom	
and	to	a	protectionism	that	history	tells	us	that	
in	the	end	protects	no	one?	No.	We	should	have	
the	confidence,	America	and	Britain	most	of	all,	
that	we	can	seize	the	global	opportunities	ahead	
and	make	the	 future	work	 for	us	 ...	 .	 [W]e	win	
our	future	not	by	retreating	from	the	world	but	
by	engaging	with	it.
Canada’s	ambassador	to	the	U.S.	voiced	the	same	
concerns	in	comments	made	during	the	congressional	
debate	on	the	Recovery	Act:	“We	are	concerned	about	
contagion,	that	is,	other	countries	also	following	pro-
tectionist	policies.	If	Buy	America	becomes	part	of	the	
stimulus	legislation,	the	United	States	will	lose	the	
moral	authority	to	pressure	others	not	to	introduce	
protectionist	policies.	A	rush	of	protectionist	actions	
could	 create	 a	 downward	 spiral	 like	 the	world	 ex-
perienced	 in	 the	1930s.”	See Congressional Record,	
Feb.	4,	2009,	at	S1529	(quoted	by	Sen.	John	McCain	
(R-Ariz.)).
... Including Open Procurement Markets:	Ironical-
ly,	while	Congress	passed	protectionist	legislation	to	
shelter	U.S.	procurement,	the	European	Commission	
reacted	in	exactly	the	opposite	way:	only	a	month	or	
so	earlier,	the	Commission	issued	a	formal	communi-
cation	urging	that	“[w]e	must	...	maintain	our	com-
mitment	to	open	markets	across	the	globe,	keeping	
our	own	market	as	open	as	possible	and	insisting	that	
third	countries	do	the	same,	in	particular	by	ensuring	
compliance	with	WTO	rules.”	To	preserve	that	com-
mitment	 to	 open	markets,	 the	Commission	urged,	
Europe	“should	take	renewed	action	to	...	[c]ontinue	
dialogues	with	key	bilateral	partners	such	as	China,	
India,	Brazil	and	Russia	and	use	 them	to	address”	
market	opening	in	various	sectors,	including	public	
procurement.	European	Commission,	Communica-
tion	from	the	Commission	to	the	European	Council,	
“A	European	Economic	Recovery	Plan,” COM(2008)	
800	final,	at	18 (Brussels,	Nov.	26,	2008),	available	at	
ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/president/pdf/
Comm_20081126.pdf.
Increased Pressure on Nations Outside the “Walled 
Garden” of U.S. Procurement:	The	U.S.	takes	a	special	
approach	to	its	free	trade	agreements	in	procurement,	
in	which	 reciprocity,	 rather	 than	 openness,	 serves	
as	the	ultimate	touchstone.	To	encourage	other	na-
tions	to	join	agreements,	the	U.S.	generally	excludes 
from	 the	 federal	market	 those	 nations	 that	 have	
not	yet	 joined	the	U.S.’	 trade	agreements.	See,	e.g., 
Christopher	R.	Yukins	and	Steven	L.	Schooner,	“In-
crementalism:	Eroding	the	Impediments	to	a	Global	
Public	Procurement	Market,”	38	Geo.	J.	Int’l	L.	529	
(2007),	available	at ssrn.com/abstract=1002446. The	
excluded	nations—including	China,	which	is	only	now	
moving	 to	 join	 the	WTO	Government	Procurement	
Agreement	(GPA),	and	India,	which	is	not—alarmed	
by	 their	 exclusion	 from	 the	hundreds	 of	 billions	 of	
dollars	 funded	by	 the	Recovery	Act,	may	 sense	 an	
increased	level	of	urgency	to	enter	into	U.S.	free	trade	
arrangements.
The	 true	 impact	 of	 the	 Recovery	Act’s	 “Buy	
American”	provisions	will	 only	be	known	when	 the	
implementing	rule	is	issued.	What	shape,	then,	should	
that	new	rule	take?	As	noted,	the	rule	may	well	have	
repercussions	far	beyond	the	U.S.,	especially	if	the	rule	
embraces	protectionism	 in	 the	midst	 of	 the	 current	
economic	storm.	Cf.	Jeffrey	E.	Garten,	“The	Dangers	of	
Turning	Inward,” Wall	Street	Journal,	March	5,	2009;	
Burton	G.	Malkiel,	“Congress	Wants	a	Trade	War,”	
Wall	Street	Journal,	Feb.	5,	2009.	Thus,	 the	 regula-
tors—those	drafting	the	implementing	provisions	for	
the	Federal	Acquisition	Regulation—should	be	mindful	
of	the	rule’s	political	context,	both	here	and	abroad.
The Perils of Rulemaking: Domestic and 
Global Political Contexts—The	 procurement	
regulators	 face	 a	 checkered	political	 landscape,	 for	
the	Obama	 administration	 earlier	may	have	 sent	
mixed	messages.	On	 the	 campaign	 trail,	 candidate	
Obama	bemoaned	 the	 (since-overturned)	 award	 of	
the	Air	Force	 tanker	 contract	 to	 a	 team	 including	
EADS	over	Boeing,	and	implied	it	was	hard	for	him	
to	believe	that	“an	American	company	that	has	been	
a	 traditional	 source	 of	 aeronautic	 excellence”	was	
not	 the	 preferred	 outcome.	Candidate	Obama	also	
pledged	to	“fight	to	ensure	that	public	contracts	are	
awarded	to	companies	that	are	committed	to	Ameri-
can	workers.”	
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But	much	has	changed	in	the	few	months	since	
the	election.	Most	of	the	world	has	plummeted	into	
a	daunting	recession	with	the	potential	to	spawn	a	
long-term	depression,	see,	e.g.,	Anthony	Faiola,	“U.S.	
Downturn	Dragging	World	 Into	Recession,” Wash-
ington	Post,	March	9,	2009,	at	A01,	and	history	offers	
too	many	lessons	against	resorting	to	protectionism	
in	the	face	of	economic	collapse.	The	Obama	adminis-
tration’s	public	positions	echo	those	lessons.	In	joint	
comments	with	Prime	Minister	Gordon	Brown,	 for	
example,	President	Obama	noted,	“Globalization	can	
be	an	enormous	force	for	good.	And	one	of	the	things	
we’ve	talked	about	repeatedly	is	that	countries	in	this	
crisis	 cannot	 start	 turning	 inward	and	 try	 to	 erect	
protectionist	 barriers.	We	 should	 encourage	 trade.”	
Remarks by President Obama and British Prime 
Minister After Meeting,	March	3,	2009,	available	at 
www.whitehouse.gov.
The Administration’s Procurement Agen-
da—True	to	these	concerns,	the	Obama	administra-
tion	has	not pressed	 for	 protectionism,	 as	 the	new	
administration	 has	 taken	 its	 first	 steps	 towards	
procurement	 reform.	The	 new	 administration	 has	
instead	stressed:
Containing Procurement Costs:	The	Recovery	Act	
and	 other	 economic	 stimulus	measures	will	 likely	
drive	 the	U.S.	 budget	 deeper	 into	 deficit	 spending	
and	mind-boggling	 debts	 for	many	 years.	To	 stem	
that	tide,	the	Obama	administration	intends	to	probe	
expensive	weapon	 system	 programs	 for	 possible	
modification	 or	 termination.	See President	Barack	
Obama,	Memorandum	for	the	Heads	of	Executive	De-
partments	and	Agencies	re:	Government	Contracting,	
March	4,	2009	(presidential	memo),	available	at www.
whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Memorandum-for-
the-Heads-of-Executive-Departments-and-Agencies-
Subject-Government-Contracting/;	 51	GC	¶	77;	 see	
also Remarks	 of	 the	President,	March	4,	 2009	 (en-
dorsing	legislation	to	strengthen	weapon	system	cost	
reviews	sponsored	by	Sens.	Carl	Levin	(D-Mich.)	and	
John	McCain,	S.	454),	available	at www.whitehouse.
gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-
Procurement-3/4/09/;	Government	Accountability	
Office,	GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: 
Best Practices for Developing and Managing Capital 
Program Costs,	 (GAO-09-3SP)	 (assessment	 tool	 for	
program	costs),	available	at www.gao.gov.
Encouraging Competition and Discouraging 
Cost-Reimbursement Contracting:	In	his	presidential	
memo	of	March	4,	Obama	directed	OMB	to	issue,	by	
the	end	of	September,	Government-wide	guidance	to	
discourage	the	use	of	noncompetitive	contracts.	Pick-
ing	up	a	theme	from	McCain,	who	has	long	criticized	
cost-reimbursement	contracts	as	inherently	wasteful,	
Obama	called	for	guidance	on	“the	appropriate	use	...	
of	all	contract	types,”	consistent	with	§	864	of	the	last	
defense	authorization	act,	which	calls	for	clearer	regu-
lation	 of	 cost-reimbursement	 contracts.	We	 remain	
skeptical	of	these	priorities	(although	we	acknowledge	
that	they	resonate	with	the	media).
Rebuilding the Acquisition Workforce:	After	
years	of	denial,	 the	Federal	Government	 is	finally	
awakening	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 its	 acquisition	work-
force	 desperately	 needs	 to	 be	 bolstered.	 See,	 e.g., 
“Acquisition	Workload	 and	 Ineffective	Oversight	
Remain	Top	Concerns,	 PSC	Finds,”	 50	GC	¶	 433;	
Professional	Services	Council,	Acquisition in Tran-
sition: Workforce, Oversight and Mission	 (October	
2008)	 (“As	…	 in	 all	 previous	 surveys,	 workforce	
issues	were	 the	 number	 one	 challenge	 and	 area	
of	 focus”),	 available	 at	www.pscouncil.org/pdfs/
2008PSCProcurementPolicySurvey.pdf;	Commission	
on	Army	Acquisition	and	Program	Management	in	
Expeditionary	Operations,	Urgent Reform Required: 
Army Expeditionary Contracting	 (Oct.	 31,	 2007),	
available	 at	www.army.mil/docs/Gansler_Com-
mission_Report_Final_071031.pdf.	The	presidential	
memo	called	 for	OMB	to	 issue	guidance	 to	“assist	
agencies	in	assessing	the	capacity	and	ability	of	the	
Federal	 acquisition	workforce.”	Of	 course,	 that	 is	
not	a	complete	solution,	but	we	hope	that	it	at	least	
signals	a	step	in	the	right	direction.
Checking Federal Outsourcing: Finally,	the	presi-
dential	memo	 called	 for	 guidance	 to	“clarify	when	
governmental	outsourcing	for	services	is	and	is	not	
appropriate,	 consistent	with	 section	 321	 of	 Public	
Law	110-417.”	Here,	as	elsewhere,	the	administra-
tion	seems	intent	on	signaling	a	change	in	tone,	not	
in	the	law:	a	departure	from	the	Bush	and	Clinton	
administrations’	 support	 for	 outsourcing,	 but	 in	
keeping	with	last	year’s	defense	authorization	act,	
which	already	called,	in	§	321,	for	a	“comprehensive	
analysis	and	development	of	[a]	single	government-
wide	 definition	 of	 inherently	 governmental”	 func-
tions	 that	should	not	be	outsourced.	Of	 course,	no	
policy	statement	alone	can	address	 the	root	 cause	
of	this	complex	phenomenon.	Today,	the	Government	
has	too	few	civil	servants	and	an	undersized	military	
to	fulfill	the	Government’s	large	(and	ever-expand-
ing)	body	of	mandates.
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Thus,	 although	 the	 president	 has	 publicly	
charted	an	ambitious	course	for	procurement	reform,	
none of	 the	 announced	 initiatives	 calls	 for	 closing	
the	federal	procurement	system	to	foreign	vendors.	
Indeed,	a	core	fiscal	goal	in	this	reform	effort—con-
taining	procurement	costs	by	encouraging	competi-
tion—would	only	suffer	if	foreign	competitors	were	
excluded	from	the	procurement	market.	See Robert	
Anderson	and	William	Kovacic,	“Competition	Policy	
and	International	Trade	Liberalisation,”	supra.
Foreign Concerns—At	the	same	time,	foreign	
governments	have	made	clear	that	they	are	watching	
closely	to	see	how	the	U.S.	will	 implement	the	Buy	
American	provisions	 in	 the	Recovery	Act,	 and	 that	
they	are	willing	to	fight	if	the	implementation	proves	
protectionist.	As	the	Washington	Trade	Daily	reported	
February	27:
	 During	an	extensive	World	Trade	Organi-
zation	 government	 procurement	 committee	
meeting	…,	 several	members—including	 the	
European	Union,	Switzerland,	Norway,	Japan,	
Canada	and	Israel—expressed	sharp	concerns	
about	US	expansion	of	its	Buy	America	provi-
sions	 in	 a	 just-passed	 economic	 stimulus	 bill	
....	
	 The	critics	said	the	move	sends	a	“negative”	
signal	to	other	committee	members	and	under-
mines	the	coverage	aspects	of	the	[WTO]	pluri-
lateral	agreement	[on	government	procurement].	
The	European	Union,	in	particular,	took	Wash-
ington	to	task	by	charging	that	the	United	States	
has	gone	against	commitments	 it	made	during	
last	November’s	Group-of-20	leaders	meeting	in	
Washington	not	to	take	any	protectionist	actions	
during	the	current	economic	downturn	....
	 The	United	States	told	the	committee	that	it	
has	yet	to	formulate	monitoring	procedures	for	
the	implementation	of	the	Buy	America	provi-
sions.	 It	 assured	members,	 however,	 that	 the	
controversial	 provisions	will	 be	 implemented	
“fairly”—in	consonance	with	 its	commitments.	
...	 But	US	 officials	 admitted	 that	more	work	
needs	to	be	done	on	implementation	in	the	com-
ing	days.	Washington	will	come	back	with	more	
information	in	the	next	committee	meeting	set	
for	May	11	to	15	…	.
Id.;	see	also Elliot	J.	Feldman,	“	‘Buy	American’	Gets	a	
Hot	Reception:	Despite	Obama	Visit,	Stimulus	Provi-
sions	Force	Canada	to	Re-Examine	Its	Relationship	
with	U.S.,” Legal	Times,	Feb.	23,	2009;	“EU Angered	
by	Obama	 ‘Buy	American’	Call,” Irish	Times,	Feb.	
4,	 2009,	 at	 21.	The	 challenge	 for	U.S.	 regulators,	
therefore,	 is	to	 implement	§	1605’s	“Buy	American”	
requirements	without	driving	 the	 globe	 closer	 to	 a	
trade	war.
Potential Ways Forward for U.S. Regula-
tors—The	 regulatory	drafters	must	 start	with	 the	
relatively	 spare	 language	 of	 statute	 itself.	 Section	
1605	of	the	Recovery	Act	reads:
BUY	AMERICAN
Sec.	 1605.	Use	 of	American	 Iron,	 Steel,	 and	
Manufactured	Goods.	
	 (a)	None	of	the	funds	appropriated	or	other-
wise	made	available	by	this	Act	may	be	used	for	
a	project	for	the	construction,	alteration,	main-
tenance,	or	repair	of	a	public	building	or	public	
work	unless	all	of	the	iron,	steel,	and	manufac-
tured	goods	used	in	the	project	are	produced	in	
the	United	States.
	 (b)	Subsection	(a)	shall	not	apply	in	any	case	
or	category	of	cases	in	which	the	head	of	the	Fed-
eral	department	or	agency	involved	finds	that—
	 (1)	applying	subsection	(a)	would	be	inconsis-
tent	with	the	public	interest;
	 (2)	iron,	steel,	and	the	relevant	manufactured	
goods	are	not	produced	in	the	United	States	in	
sufficient	 and	 reasonably	 available	 quantities	
and	of	a	satisfactory	quality;	or
	 (3)	inclusion	of	iron,	steel,	and	manufactured	
goods	produced	in	the	United	States	will	increase	
the	cost	of	 the	overall	project	by	more	than	25	
percent.
	 (c)	 If	 the	head	 of	 a	Federal	 department	 or	
agency	determines	that	it	is	necessary	to	waive	
the	 application	 of	 subsection	 (a)	 based	 on	 a	
finding	under	subsection	(b),	the	head	of	the	de-
partment	or	agency	shall	publish	in	the	Federal	
Register	a	detailed	written	justification	as	to	why	
the	provision	is	being	waived.
	 (d)	This	section	shall	be	applied	in	a	manner	
consistent	with	United	States	obligations	under	
international	agreements.
P.L.	111-5,	§	1605.	Section	1605	thus:
•	 Articulated	a	default	 rule	 that	all	“iron,	steel,	
and	manufactured	 goods”	 used	 in	 a	 “public	
building”	or	“public	work”	funded	by	the	Recov-
ery	Act	must	be	produced	in	the	U.S.
•	 Failed	 to	 define	 “public	 building”	 or	 “public	
work.”	The	House	version	of	the	legislation	had	
defined	those	terms	by	reference	to	the	original	
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Buy	American	Act,	41	USCA	§	10c,	 to	 include	
“airports,	bridges,	canals,	dams,	dikes,	pipelines,	
railroads,	multiline	mass	transit	systems,	roads,	
tunnels,	harbors,	and	piers.”	This	more	detailed	
definition	could	narrow	debate	over	which	“pub-
lic	works”	might	be	covered	by	the	new	law.
•	 Left	unclear	whether	 the	requirement	applies	
only	to	end	products	ordered	under	contracts	or	
also	to	components.
•	 Left	 agency	 heads	 the	 option	 of	waiving	 the	
requirement	 for	 reasons	 of	 public	 interest,	 or	
a	defined	measure	of	excessive	cost,	 i.e.,	 if	the	
overall	 cost	 of	 the	 project	would	 increase	 by	
more	than	25	percent.
•	 Explicitly	mandated	 an	 outcome	 “consistent	
with”	U.S.	obligations	under	international	agree-
ments.	The	statute	did	not,	however,	state	how	
the	new	requirements	could	be	reconciled	with	
the	many	U.S.	trade	agreements.
The	conference	report	that	accompanied	the	leg-
islation	sheds	little	light	on	Congress’	intent:
Section	1605	provides	for	the	use	of	American	
iron,	 steel	 and	manufactured	 goods,	 except	 in	
certain	 instances.	 Section	 1605(d)	 is	 not	 in-
tended	to	repeal	by	implication	the	President’s	
authority	 under	Title	 III	 of	 the	Trade	Agree-
ments	Act	of	1979.	The	conferees	anticipate	that	
the	Administration	will	 rely	 on	 the	 authority	
under	19	U.S.C.	2511(b)	[affording	the	President	
authority	to	waive	trade	barriers]	to	the	extent	
necessary	to	comply	with	U.S.	obligations	under	
the	WTO	Agreement	 on	Government	Procure-
ment	and	under	U.S.	free	trade	agreements	and	
so	that	section	1605	will	not	apply	to	least	de-
veloped	countries	to	the	same	extent	that	it	does	
not	apply	to	the	parties	to	those	international	
agreements.	The	conferees	also	note	that	waiver	
authority	 under	 section	 2511(b)(2)	 [a	 special	
waiver	authority	for	nations,	other	than	major	
industrial	nations,	which	will	comply	with	the	
GPA]	has	not	been	used.
H.	Rep.	No.111-16,	111th	Cong.,	1st	Sess.	512	(2009).	
The	 conference	 report	 thus	 reflects	 the	 conferees’	
understanding	 that	 the	U.S.	would	honor	 its	 trade	
agreements,	and	that	least-developed	nations	should	
continue	 to	 be	 afforded	 special	 admission	 to	 the	
“walled	garden”	of	U.S.	procurement,	but	offered	little	
further	 guidance.	 In	 light	 of	 this	 relatively	 sparse	
legislative	 record,	 there	are	 several	 potential	ways	
forward	for	the	U.S.	regulators.
Regulatory Option: FAR Pt. —The	 sim-
plest,	most	expeditious	and	elegant	approach	would	
be	to	 fold	Recovery	Act	procurement,	when	under-
taken	by	federal	agencies,	into	the	existing	regula-
tory	 structure	 in	 FAR	 pt.	 25.	The	 FAR	 describes	
a	 decision-making	 process	 for	 federal	 contracting	
officials	assessing	foreign	goods	and	services.	That	
“decision	tree”	is	quite	complex,	but	it	accommodates	
the	U.S.’	many	 (and	sometimes	overlapping)	 trade	
agreements.	 If	 the	Recovery	Act’s	 Buy	American	
provisions	are	to	defer	to	existing	trade	agreements,	
then	goods	and	services	to	be	purchased	under	the	
Recovery	Act	should	simply	follow	the	existing	regu-
latory	framework.
The	 existing	 structure	 in	FAR	pt.	 25	 provides	
a	 pragmatic	 solution,	 for	FAR	pt.	 25	 both	permits 
and	 excludes	 foreign	 vendors.	 For	 procurements	
over	 certain	monetary	 thresholds,	 FAR	pt.	 25	 ac-
commodates	 vendors	 from	nations	with	 standing	
open-market	agreements	with	the	U.S.	But	FAR	pt.	
25	 also	 acknowledges	 that	 those	 larger	 purchases	
may	not go	to	vendors	from	nations	that	do	not	have	
trade	 agreements	with	 the	U.S.	 (or	 are	 not	 least-	
developed	nations).	Thus,	FAR	pt.	25	already	excludes	
nations	without	 open-market	 agreements	with	 the	
U.S.,	such	as	China,	and	creates	a	(so-called)	“walled	
garden”	 for	 vendors	 from	 the	U.S.	 and	 from	 na-
tions	with	open-market	agreements.	Of	course,	this	
means	that	the	central	goal	of	the	Recovery	Act’s	§	
1605—excluding	non-U.S.	 iron,	 steel	 and	manufac-
tured	goods—may	already	be	met,	in	large	part,	by	
FAR	pt.	25.
This	approach	raises	an	obvious	question:	if	the	
Recovery	Act	can	simply	be	folded	into	FAR	pt.	25,	
would	 the	 new	 law’s	 domestic	 preferences	 in	 fact	
mean	anything?	The	answer	 is	yes,	but	the	change	
would	be	marginal.	For	example,	although	the	“Buy	
American”	 provisions	 generally	would	 not	 create	
new	constraints	for	federal	agencies	that	are	already	
bound	by	existing	trade	agreements,	the	Recovery	Act	
would impose	new	domestic	 content	 requirements	
where	the	trade	agreements	do	not	apply—such	as	in	
procurements	by	the	13	states	that	are	not	signatories	
to	 the	WTO	GPA.	Because	the	FAR	does	not	apply	
directly	 to	 state	 procurements	using	Recovery	Act	
funds	(§	1610	of	the	Recovery	Act	says	that	the	FAR	
will	not	apply	to	Recovery	Act	procurements	covered	
by	other	 laws),	presumably	 the	FAR	drafters	could	
leave	to	the	states	how	to	implement	the	new	“Buy	
American”	requirements.
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This	 “short	 and	 simple”	 regulatory	 approach	
also	would	reduce	political	unrest:	making	clear	that	
the	Recovery	Act	does	not	carve	out	new	exceptions	
to	 foreign	 firms’	 opportunities	 in	 the	U.S.	market	
would	 sharply	 reduce	 concerns,	 and	 rhetoric,	 over	
protectionism—and	so	would	avoid	fueling	the	fires	
of	protectionism	abroad.	Cf. Art	Pine,	“Hurt	Ameri-
can?,” Congress	Daily,	March	 9,	 2009	 (noting	 that	
“Buy	American”	provisions	in	the	Recovery	Act	have	
encouraged	protectionism	 in	 other	nations).	 In	 the	
current	environment,	with	political	concerns	magni-
fied	by	the	economic	crisis,	easing	the	war	of	words	
over	protectionism	seems	a	sound	course.
Regulatory Option: The Specialty Metals 
Model—A	second	approach	would	 be	 to	 adopt	 the	
regulatory	 regime	 normally	 applied	 to	 specialty	
metals	bought	by	the	U.S.	Defense	Department.	See 
U.S.	Department	 of	Defense,	Defense	Procurement	
and	Acquisition	 Policy,	Restrictions on Specialty 
Metals (10 U.S.C. 2533b),	available	at www.acq.osd.
mil/dpap/index.html	(Web	site	chronicles	evolution	
of	 specialty	metals	 restrictions).	Under	 10	USCA	
§	 2533b,	when	DOD	purchases	 certain	major	 cat-
egories	of	items—such	as	aircraft,	missile	and	space	
systems,	ships,	tank	and	automotive	items,	weapon	
systems,	 and	ammunition—only	 items	and	 compo-
nents	containing	domestic	specialty	metals	may	be	
purchased.	 See,	 e.g.,	 “DOD	Says	Domestic	 Source	
Restrictions	Not	Necessary	 for	Specialty	Metals,”	6	
IGC	¶	13;	“DOD	Final	Rule	Waives	Specialty	Metal	
Restrictions	On	COTS	Item	Acquisition,”	4	IGC	¶	93;	
John	W.	Chierichella	and	David	S.	Gallacher,	Feature	
Comment,	“The	Continuing	Saga	Of	Specialty	Met-
als—Nothing	Is	Ever	So	Bad	That	It	Cannot	Be	Made	
Worse,”	4	IGC	¶	26;	John	J.	Pavlick	and	Rebecca	E.	
Pearson,	“New	DOD	Guidance	on	the	Berry	Amend-
ment:	Still	Berry	After	All	These	Years,”	42	Proc.	Law.	
7	(Winter	2007);	Paul	M.	Kerlin,	“Note,	1,000	Trucks	
Can’t	All	Be	Wrong:	The	Untenable	Reality	 of	 the	
Specialty	Metals	Requirement,”	 38	Pub.	Cont.	L.J.	
237	(2008).
There	are	compelling	reasons,	however,	not	to	ap-
ply	the	specialty	metals	regime.	First,	the	specialty	
metals	 regulatory	 regime	 took	years	 to	 implement.	
Delaying	 the	 Recovery	Act’s	 implementation,	 in	
contrast,	 could	be	disastrous.	Second,	 although	 the	
specialty	metals	statute	applies	a	domestic	preference	
to	both	end items and	components,	the	Recovery	Act	
does	not specifically	 state	 that	 its	“Buy	American”	
protections	 should	 be	 extended	 to	 components	 as	
well	as	 the	end	products	actually	purchased	under	
a	 contract.	 Experience	with	 the	 specialty	metals	
requirement	demonstrates	that	forcing	suppliers	to	
ensure	that	components,	as	well	as	end	items,	meet	
domestic-content	requirements	imposes	enormously	
costly	compliance	burdens.	Also,	 in	a	curious	twist,	
only	domestic vendors	must	bear	this	burden	regard-
ing	components:	foreign	vendors	need	not	ensure	that	
components	are	compliant,	so	long	as	the	end	product	
being	offered	by	the	foreign	vendor	(the	end	product	
which	 contains	 the	 component)	 is	 “substantially	
transformed”	 in	a	designated	nation.	This	perverse	
result—sometimes	known	as	the	“Frankenstein”	ef-
fect,	see John	W.	Chierichella	and	David	S.	Gallacher,	
Feature	Comment,	“Specialty	Metals	and	the	Berry	
Amendment—Frankenstein’s	Monster	and	Bad	Do-
mestic	Policy,” 46	GC	¶	168—could	mean	that	foreign 
vendors	from	nations	with	trade	agreements	with	the	
U.S.	would	actually	enjoy	a	comparative advantage 
over domestic U.S. vendors,	were	the	Recovery	Act’s	
“Buy	American”	requirement	to	be	funneled	through	
the	specialty	metals	regime.	
Regulatory Option: The Federal Transit 
Funding Model—A	 final	 option	 is	 found	 in	 the	
regulatory	 regime	 through	which	 the	Government	
administers	“Buy	America”	requirements	in	federally	
funded	transit	projects.	See 49	USCA	§	5323;	49	CFR	
pt.	661.	This	approach	is	superficially	attractive	for	
its	apparent	symmetry.	The	governing	federal	transit	
statute,	much	like	the	Recovery	Act,	says	that	federal	
funds	may	be	obligated	for	a	transit	project	“only	if	
the	steel,	iron,	and	manufactured	goods	used	in	the	
project	are	produced	in	the	United	States.”
From	there,	however,	the	federal	transit	regime	
morphs	into	something	of	a	quagmire.	First,	unlike	
procurement	 conducted	 under	 the	 Recovery	Act,	
federal	grants	 to	state	and	 local	governments—the	
typical	means	of	funding	federal	transit	projects—are	
generally	exempted	from,	for	example,	the	WTO	GPA.	
See GPA,	Appendix	I	Annexes—General	Notes	(“pro-
curement	in	terms	of	U.S.	coverage	does	not	include	
non-contractual	agreements	or	any	form	of	government	
assistance,	including	cooperative	agreements,	grants,	
loans,	equity	infusions,	guarantees,	fiscal	incentives,	
and	governmental	provision	of	goods	and	services	to	
persons	or	governmental	authorities	not	specifically	
covered	under	U.S.	annexes	to	this	agreement”),	avail-
able	at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/appen-
dices_e.htm.	Procurement	under	the	Recovery	Act,	in	
contrast,	will	be	carried	out	at	least	in	part	by	federal	
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agencies	directly.	It	would	be	essential,	therefore,	to	
clarify	that	those	federal	agencies	are	still	subject	to	
U.S.	trade	agreements,	for	the	Recovery	Act	specifically	
states	that	procurements	funded	by	the	Recovery	Act	
will	honor	U.S.	trade	agreements.
Second,	 the	 federal	 transit	 project	 regulatory	
regime	would	cause	the	new	law’s	“Buy	American”	re-
quirements	to	apply	to	components,	as	well	as	the	end	
products	listed	in	a	contract,	much	as	those	require-
ments	are	applied	to	components	in	federally	funded	
transit	projects.	This	would	invite	a	regulatory	regime	
of	 enormous	 complexity.	Under	 the	 federal	 transit	
regulations,	 for	 example,	although	 requirements	 for	
steel	 and	 iron	apply	 to	 all	“construction	materials	
made	primarily	 of	 steel	 or	 iron	 and	used	 in	 infra-
structure	 projects	 such	 as	 transit	 or	maintenance	
facilities,	rail	lines,	and	bridges,”	the	requirements	“do	
not	apply	to	steel	or	iron	used	as	components	or	sub-
components	of	other	manufactured	products	or	rolling	
stock.”	Manufactured	products,	on	the	other	hand,	are	
treated	differently:	for	a	manufactured	product	“to	be	
considered	produced	in	the	United	States,”	all	of	the	
manufacturing	processes	 for	 the	project	must	 take	
place	in	the	U.S.,	and	all	of	the	components	must	be	
of	U.S.	origin,	though	the	origin	of	its	subcomponents	
is	not	considered	relevant.	49	CFR	§	661.5.	Sorting	
out	this	very	complex	regulatory	regime	in	Recovery	
Act	projects	could	take	years—a	delay	that	the	U.S.	
economy,	which	 desperately	 needs	 new	 stimulus	
funds,	simply	cannot	afford.
Conclusion—The	“Buy	American”	requirements	
in	 §	 1605	 of	 the	Recovery	Act	 remain	 extremely	
controversial.	Moreover,	they	threaten	to	stir	protec-
tionism—if	not	an	outright	trade	war—among	other	
nations.	Protectionism,	most	observers	agree,	could	
be	 catastrophic	 in	 the	 current	 economic	 crisis,	 and	
nothing	 in	 the	Obama	administration’s	 first	 forays	
into	procurement	policy	suggests	that	the	new	admin-
istration	believes	additional	domestic	preferences	are	
needed	for	U.S.	procurement.	The	pending	challenge	
for	federal	regulators,	therefore,	will	be	to	craft	a	rule	
that	contains	the	Recovery	Act’s	international	impact,	
while	 implementing	Congress’	 intent.	The	 optimal	
approach	seems	to	be	 the	most	simple:	 to	 fold	new	
procurement	under	the	Recovery	Act	into	the	exist-
ing	FAR	regulatory	structure,	which,	in	keeping	with	
the	Recovery	Act,	accommodates	the	U.S.’	many	trade	
agreements.	Bringing	Recovery	Act	 procurements	
within	the	FAR	structure	would	ensure	that	federal	
agencies’	procurements	adhere	to	those	trade	agree-
ments.	(In	addition,	this	approach	also	dramatically	
increases	 the	 likelihood	 that	an	already	over-taxed	
acquisition	workforce	can	consistently	apply	the	new	
rules.)	From	there,	the	FAR	drafters	could	leave	it	to	
state	governments	(and	other	recipients	of	Recovery	
Act	 funding)	 to	 implement	 the	new	 law’s	 domestic	
content	requirements.	This	simple,	quick	and	elegant	
approach	would	be	the	least	likely	to	generate	new,	
potentially	disastrous	waves	of	protectionism	in	the	
critical,	but	treacherous,	waters	of	global	commerce.
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